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CHAPTER 11

by William A. Herbert

Public Workers

P

ublic workers began self-organizing in New York City in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, coinciding with an increase in
governmental services and the advent of civil service reform.
Various associations of federal, state,
immunity from hard work. The steand local government workers
reotype is more than a century old.
formed along occupational (postIt was used in a May 1911 speech by
al, sanitation, and clerical workers;
President William Howard Taft to
teachers, police, and firefighters)
justify placing conditions on public
and departmental lines, or accordworkers “that should not be and
ing to civil service status. An early,
ought not be imposed upon those
important goal of many employee
who serve private employers.”
associations was enforcement of
It remains a rhetorical tool used to
civil service rules, a goal shared by
create divisions between publicgovernment-reform groups to end
and private-sector workers, and
political patronage-based decito attack collective bargaining, job
sion-making.
security protections, and pensions.
Organizational strength varied.
Some early New York public
Interunion rivalries and factional disemployee organizations affiliated
putes, as well as political and stratewith the labor movement, which had
gic differences, permeate much
long sought to make government a
of the city’s public-sector labor his“model employer” as a means of pertory. Among the most unified have
suading private employers to follow
been occupation-specific organizasuit, particularly in efforts to win the
tions. Over time, the racial, ethnic,
eight-hour workday.
and gender composition of the city
In the late 19th century postal
workforce has substantially changed
and sanitation workers joined the
as well, with the uniformed services
Knights of Labor. Later the Amerrequiring litigation to compel a diverse ican Federation of Labor (AFL) charand integrated workforce.
tered public-sector organizations
One thing has not changed: the and advocated for laws to improve
persistent stereotype of government working conditions in government,
workers as a privileged class with
even when it eschewed legislative
job security, pensions, and alleged
solutions for industrial workers. The
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New York City Teachers Union affiliated with the AFL in 1916. Two years
later, the Uniform Fireman’s Association (UFA) joined as well. Other
employee organizations remained
nonaligned, priding themselves on
being protective associations of civil
servants, rather than defining themselves as unions bent on collective
bargaining. Resistance to unionization came from another employee
group—those holding white-collar
government jobs who viewed union-

ization as undermining their professional status. And some had no
choice: the Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Association was prohibited by municipal law from affiliating with the
labor movement, even after the AFL
had lifted its two-decade ban on
chartering police unions. (The lifting
of the ban led to Boston’s dramatic
1919 police strike after officers were
fired because their union accepted
an AFL charter.)

Traditional Means of
Collective Advocacy:
Lobbying and Political Action

T

he fact that they worked
for the government caused
public-sector workers to rely
on strategies and tactics different
from their private-sector counterparts. State power necessitates
public-sector unions to develop and
maintain good working relationships
with public officials. The government
has the power to grant or deny labor
rights to its workers and to create
and enforce laws concerning public

employment. A prime example of
the exercise of that power is the exclusion of government workers from
the right to unionize and engage in
collective bargaining guaranteed
by the 1935 National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), the 1937 New York
State Labor Relations Act, and the
1938 New York State Constitution.
Without collective bargaining,
public employee organizations lobbied and engaged in political action

Strikebreakers
“Breaking Garbage
Strike at $5 a day,”
1911

to improve working conditions. Most
public-worker organizations limited their focus to bread-and-butter
issues: wages, hours, pensions, and
job security. The latter was what
attracted many workers, including
African Americans, women, and
ethnic minorities, to public service.
Early legislative victories brought
elements of industrial democracy to
New York’s public sector by giving
employees a voice in the workplace
through due process disciplinary
procedures, a salary classification
system, equal pay for women teachers, and platoon systems for firefighters and police.
A prominent practitioner of
maintaining close working relationships with elected officials,
party leaders, and candidates was
an organization of workers in city
departments known as the Civil
Service Forum, long led by onetime
Deputy Comptroller Frank J. Prial
who owned the civil service newspaper, The Chief. The Civil Service
Forum closely aligned itself with
politicians and it opposed collective bargaining and strikes. The
organization’s close collaboration
and entanglement with partisan
political forces undermined its organizational independence.
The effectiveness of lobbying and informal negotiations was
limited. Public officials had no legal
obligation to meet or confer with
subordinates or their representa-

tives. The civil liberties of government workers were suppressed,
and workers were retaliated against,
based on political or union activities.
Presidential gag orders had prohibited federal workers from lobbying Congress concerning working
conditions. The New York City
Charter once banned police officers,
firefighters, and teachers from joining
or supporting organizations that
lobbied, and teachers were subject to
loyalty oaths.
During the first half of the 20th
century, legislation made gradual inroads. The federal Lloyd-La Follette
Act of 1912 was the first important
law to protect the civil liberties of
public workers. The law overturned
the presidential gag order, granted
postal workers the right to form
a union, and codified tenure protections for many federal workers.
Another important civil liberties
development was the 1920 Civil
Rights Law provision signed by
New York Governor Alfred E. Smith
protecting the right of public workers to petition government officials.
Extending that individual right into
a collective right to file departmental
grievances with union representation became a priority for many
organizations, but such procedures
did not get codified until the 1950s
and 1960s. Even today, most workplace-related speech and petitions by
individual public employees remain
unprotected by the First Amendment.

Early Examples of
Militant Public Unionism
in New York City

L

obbying and political action
were never the sole means
adopted by municipal workers. From the beginning there was a
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more militant strain. Early examples
include periodic strikes by sanitation workers over wages, hours,
and workloads, including an April
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1911 strike that was defeated with
strikebreakers.
In the 1930s militancy grew
among other groups of city workers. Bricklayers and other building
trades workers struck over wages
on projects funded by the federal Works Progress Administration
(WPA). Many of the more militant
public-sector unions were Communist led. A union of city relief workers,
the Association of Workers in Public
Relief Agencies (AWPRA), demanded the right to bargain collectively, led demonstrations and sit-ins,
challenged civil service exams as
having an adverse impact on African
Americans, and protested anti-union
retaliation. Informal negotiations between the AWPRA and agency officials resulted in a 1935 departmental
disciplinary procedure that included
union representation, a review of the
discipline by a neutral board, and a
ban on discrimination based on race,
creed, or union activity.
Social unionism, which links
workplace issues with broader social
justice causes, grew as well during
the Depression Era. The AWPRA
opposed race discrimination and

police brutality and aligned itself
with others in advocating for the
unemployed. The New York City
Teachers Union worked with community groups to improve public
schools by supporting increases in
funding, the hiring of African-American and Puerto Rican teachers,
the introduction of African-American history and culture into the
curriculum, and a ban on racist and
anti-Semitic textbooks.
In 1936 the AWPRA joined
the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), an AFL affiliate. The
AFSCME’s primary mission at its
founding was to expand and enforce the civil service system. New
York AWPRA leaders VVW Flaxer and William Gaulden became
AFSCME vice presidents, making
Gaulden one of the highest-ranking African Americans nationally in
union leadership.
Following the creation of the
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO), the AWPRA and its
members formed the nucleus of a
competing CIO public-sector union,
the State, County and Municipal
Abram Flaxer, 1937

Photograph by Harris
and Ewing
Abram Flaxer, a leader
of public relief workers,
became an important
figure in the city’s emerging CIO union politics
during the 1930s.
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Workers of America (SCMWA). African Americans and women, including
Ewart Guinier, Mary Luciel McGorkey,
and Eleanor Goding, were among
the SCMWA’s leaders. It took decades
before other public-sector organizations had integrated leadership.
The SCMWA’s founding principles focused on bargaining, legislation, education, and antidiscrimination. Strikes and picketing were
prohibited. The union’s moderate
tactics were remarkably different
from the CIO-led industrial sit-down

strikes. The initial rejection of strikes
stemmed from the CIO’s alliance
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who opposed militancy by government workers, but recognized the
legitimacy of public employee
self-organization. The SCMWA’s position on strikes fluctuated throughout the 1940s. The union was
successful in negotiating collective
bargaining agreements in the late
1930s and 1940s with public employers in other states including New
Jersey, Michigan, and West Virginia.

City Worker Unionization in
the 1940s and 1950s

F

or the next decade the SCMWA, the AFSCME, the Civil
Service Forum, and other
organizations competed to represent
city workers, department by department. This competitive form of
plural representation required each
organization to have a presence in
the workplace, and regular personal
contact with department workers.
The SCMWA’s strongest base of
support was among welfare and
hospital workers.
In 1941 New York City Department of Sanitation workers quit the
Civil Service Forum and joined the
AFSCME. The move took place in
the face of an organizing campaign
by the CIO’s Sanitation Workers
Organizing Committee led by the
SCMWA’s Flaxer. Mayor Fiorello La
Guardia and Sanitation Commissioner William F. Carey thwarted the CIO
campaign to organize the 10,000
workers by granting the AFSCME
exclusive representation rights in the
department. Collective bargaining
rights for city workers and political
favoritism in the Sanitation Department were issues raised in William
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O’Dwyer’s unsuccessful campaign in
1941 to deny La Guardia a third term.
The SCMWA also organized state
workers in the city, creating locals
in state departments in competition
with the Civil Service Employees
Association (CSEA). The SCMWA
successfully lobbied Governor
Herbert H. Lehman in 1939 to issue
a memorandum directing state
agency grievance procedures with
a right to representation. But a bill
supported by the SCMWA to require
each city department to create a
similar grievance procedure and to
grant city workers the right to a join
a union died in the City Council.
Collective bargaining in New York’s
public sector was slow in coming.
The delay can be attributed to three
factors: lack of support from civil
service organizations, legal impediments, and opposition from politicians, including Mayor La Guardia,
who objected to negotiating limitations on his authority. Indeed, La
Guardia opposed SCMWA-supported
collective bargaining legislation. He
also refused to negotiate with the
CIO’s Transport Workers Union of
UNION CITY: 1898–1975

Members of the
New York City
Teachers Union
protest Board
of Education
interrogations and
firings of alleged
communists, 1950

America (TWU) after two bankrupt
private subway lines were unified
with a municipal line to create an
extensive public system, although he
did agree to a grievance procedure
with union representation.
The tide began to turn in the
O’Dwyer administration. After succeeding La Guardia in 1946, William
O’Dwyer aligned himself with the
TWU and its president, Michael J.
Quill, to support negotiations for
transit workers. O’Dwyer rewarded
the SCMWA by ending the AFSCME’s exclusive representational role
in the sanitation department. Later
that year, the CIO merged the SCMWA with another of its public-sector
unions to form the United Public
Workers of America (UPWA).
But tensions remained high.
Public workers in New York State
were part of the nationwide strike
wave that followed World War II.
Upstate strikes and threatened
strikes by the TWU resulted in a
strong political backlash in Albany.
A teachers’ strike in Buffalo for higher wages precipitated the legislature
to pass the Condon-Wadlin Act in
Public Workers

1947 with draconian anti-strike penalties for public workers.
The passage of the CondonWadlin Act coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, a dark and repressive period in public employment.
The UPWA tried to remain vigilant,
leading demonstrations at Welfare
Department offices concerning staffing levels and relief payment increases, and bargaining contracts at The
New School (a Manhattan University)
and trade schools. The UPWA and its
activists were subject to city and federal investigations, targeted by city
officials, and purged from the CIO in
1950, claiming the organization was
dominated by Communists.
Meanwhile, public school teachers
active in the New York City Teachers
Union, a UPWA affiliate, were investigated and fired under the Feinberg Law. (This 1949 civil service law
amendment prohibited the employment of teachers and others in public
schools and colleges who advocated
or taught “the doctrine that the
government of the United States
or of any state or of any political subdivision thereof should be
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overthrown or overturned by force,
AFSCME losing more than two-thirds
violence or any unlawful means.”)
of its city membership. The biggest
The attacks on the UPWA and
loss came in 1951 when the United
its activists by the CIO and govSanitationmen’s Association (USA),
ernment officials led to the union’s
under the leadership of John J.
demise. The UPWA’s destruction did DeLury, affiliated with the Internanot end worker militancy or efforts
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters.
to attain legal protections for selfThe following year, Henry Feinstein
organization and collective bargain- received a charter to form Teaming. Instead, it opened space for
sters Local 237 with hundreds of
expanded organizing by rival labor
former members of AFSCME District
organizations, some of which hired
Council 37 (DC 37), who were auformer UPWA activists such as Jack
to-engine men and a small group of
Bigel, who, years later, became a key hospital workers. Feinstein’s deparlabor advisor during negotiations
ture provided the AFSCME’s Jerry
that helped the city avoid bankruptWurf with an opportunity to rebuild
cy during the mid-1970s fiscal crisis.
DC 37 using trade union strategies
In the early 1950s, leadership
and tactics.
and tactical disputes resulted in the

The Beginning of Collective
Bargaining for City Workers

T

he dawn of public-sector collective bargaining in New York
came with the 1953 election
of Mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr., who
received support from the labor
movement. Following his inauguration, Wagner gave a green light for
the holding of representation elections and collective bargaining for
transit workers, leading to the first
formal public-sector agreements in
New York. He also issued an interim
order in 1954 that recognized the
right of city workers to join a union
without retaliation and to have representation under agency grievance
procedures. Governor Thomas E.
Dewey issued a similar executive
order a few years earlier, at the urging of the CSEA, for state workers.
DC 37 put the interim order to
use and campaigned to organize
5,000 New York City Department
of Parks employees. Following a
well-publicized battle with Parks
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Department Commissioner Robert
Moses, and City Hall intervention, DC
37 won the right to represent park
workers after an election.
Another turning point came in
1957, when the city implemented
nonexclusive dues deduction checkoff for all city unions. Dues checkoff
was a goal of many unions, because
it is a more efficient alternative to
collecting dues directly from members in the workplace and after work.
Dues checkoff had been part of deals
reached a decade earlier between
the TWU and transit officials, and
between the UPWA and the City of
Yonkers, to avoid threatened strikes.
Finally, after years of study, in
March 1958, Wagner issued Executive Order 49 (EO 49), referred to
as the “Little Wagner Act,” which
created the largest public-sector
collective bargaining program in the
country. Yet EO 49 had its limitations: it created a representation
UNION CITY: 1898–1975

system dominated by Wagner and
his appointees, with a cumbersome
array of citywide and departmental
units based on occupational classifications; it also lacked a neutral impasse procedure. Still, it introduced
public-sector collective bargaining
in New York.
The UFA was the first union certified as the exclusive representative
for a bargaining unit, which included
officers of all ranks within the fire department, except the chief and deputy chiefs. The USA was the second,
and the first to negotiate a contract
with the city, covering 10,000 sanitation department workers.
From then on, collective bargaining between unions and the city grew
rapidly, and so did strikes. A short
teachers strike for recognition in 1960
led to a representation election won
by the United Federation of Teachers
(UFT) over other teacher unions. In
1962 the UFT and the Board of Education negotiated a first contract for
a unit of more than 35,000 teachers, but only after another one-day
strike. During this period, there were
other short strikes by sanitation

workers, city motor vehicle drivers,
and others.
Wagner, in 1963, lifted the original exclusion of police from coverage under EO 49 (although in lifting
the ban, he disqualified any union
that admitted employees other than
police force members or advocated
in favor of strikes). His extension of
collective bargaining to the police
department resulted in five bargaining units based on rank and represented by separate unions, with
police officers being represented
by the PBA.

AFSCME leaders
welcome Lilllian
Roberts (second
from right) after her
release from jail,
1968

DC 37’s Lillian Roberts
was jailed under the
Taylor Act for leading a
strike by workers in New
York State mental hospitals. A judge released her
after she served 14 days
of a 30-day sentence.

Civil Rights, Collective
Bargaining, and Strikes

E

ven as they fought for bargaining rights, a number of
municipal unions also pursued
broader social goals. DC 37, the UFT,
and other city unions supported the
growing Civil Rights Movement and
provided it with financial support.
Thousands of their members participated in the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.
In 1965, the Welfare Department
and the Department of Hospitals, two
former strongholds of the UPWA,
became the focus of increased
Public Workers

Anti-Mike Quill
button, 1966

The 1966 transit strike
sparked a backlash of
commuter resentment.
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TWU President Mike
Quill tears up a temporary strike-barring
injunction issued by
State Supreme Court
Justice George
Tilzer, December 31,
1965

Photograph by Paul
DeMaria
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militancy and organizing. Eight
thousand Welfare Department
workers represented by the Social
Service Employees Union (SSEU)
and DC 37 participated in a month
long strike that was settled after the
city accepted a fact-finding panel’s
recommendations for substantial
wage and health-benefit increases,
workload limitations, and increased
staffing. Mayor Wagner also agreed
to appoint a panel to recommend
changes to the city’s collective bargaining program composed of labor
representatives led by DC 37’s Victor
Gotbaum, city officials, and neutral
public members.
Later that year, DC 37 scored
a major victory over Teamsters
Local 237 in an election to represent

20,000 hospital workers after a decade of interunion rivalry. Two African Americans, Local 237’s Bill Lewis
and DC 37’s Lillian Roberts, played
leading roles in the bitter campaign.
Subsequent DC 37 victories in departmental elections resulted in the
union gaining majority support and
the right to negotiate on a citywide
basis for a unit of all clerical workers
and a unit of employees under the
Career and Salary Plan, a city classification system of mostly white-collar titles and occupational groups.
Additional election victories by DC
37 made it the largest and most
powerful municipal union in the city.
But DC 37 was not the only
militant union. After decades of
strike threats, on January 1, 1966, the
UNION CITY: 1898–1975

TWU Local 100
members on strike,
1966

Photograph by Paul
Slade

TWU pulled the trigger with a strike
of 35,000 members that shut down
the transit system for 12 days. The
strike began the same day a new
mayor, Republican John V. Lindsay,
was sworn into office, a harbinger of
labor conflicts to come during his

first term. Virtually all the municipal
unions had endorsed Lindsay’s opponent, Democrat Abraham Beame,
in the 1965 campaign, and they
remained suspicious of Lindsay’s
aloofness and his labor agenda.

Union Rights Granted to All
New York Public Workers and
Strike Penalties Increased

T

he 1966 transit strike led to
new calls for replacing the
Condon-Wadlin Act, which
had proven ineffective in deterring
the strike. Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed a committee of
experts, headed by George Taylor, a
professor at the Wharton School of
Business, to propose legal changes to improve labor relations and
avoid strikes. The Taylor Committee’s March 1966 report broke new
ground by recommending collective
bargaining rights for all state and
local government workers, along
with new penalties and procedures
for strikes. In the same month, the
Public Workers

tripartite panel appointed by Wagner
issued a report with its own recommendations for improving city-labor
relations. Those recommendations,
which were opposed by the SSEU
and other unions, formed the basis
for the New York City Collective
Bargaining Law (NYCCBL).
Opposition to the proposed Taylor Law substantially delayed its passage in Albany and the enactment of
the NYCCBL by the city council. Municipal unions vehemently opposed
the Taylor Law’s anti-strike provisions and held a May 1967 rally at
Madison Square Garden to condemn
them. Local governments opposed
151

Day three of the
sanitation workers
strike, 1968
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the expansion of collective bargaining rights to employees of counties,
cities, towns, and villages beyond
the five boroughs. On the other
hand, the CSEA strongly supported
the law because it would expand
collective bargaining geographically
and continue the ban on publicsector strikes.
On September 1, 1967, the Taylor
Law and the NYCCBL became
effective. Besides extending collective bargaining rights throughout
New York State and increasing strike
penalties, the Taylor Law codified
dues deduction checkoff, established
bargaining-impasse procedures,
permitted card-check certification,
and banned unions that discriminated based on race, creed, color, or
religion. The NYCCBL created a new

city collective bargaining program
consistent with the Taylor Law,
replacing EO 49. A neutral tripartite municipal agency, the Office of
Collective Bargaining (OCB), was
formed to determine representation
issues, consolidate the unwieldy system of bargaining units, and administer procedures to resolve contract
grievances and bargaining impasses.
The Taylor Law’s new strike penalties did not deter the UFT, led by Al
Shanker. The UFT organized a threeweek strike of 45,000 teachers shortly after the law became effective. The
strike concerned wages, class size,
and the power of classroom teachers
to remove disruptive students.
In 1968, there were major and
divisive strikes by sanitation workers
as well as teachers. The sanitation
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Supporters of striking New York City
teachers, City Hall,
1968

UFT supporters rallying
during the divisive 1968
teachers’ strikes.

workers walked off the job after
rejecting an agreement with the city
negotiated by their leader, John J.
DeLury. The strike angered many
city residents as thousands of tons
of garbage remained uncollected
for nine days.
At the beginning of the 1968–69
school year, the UFT led a series
of strikes over community control
of the schools and tenure rights in
Ocean Hill–Brownsville, shutting
down the school system for months.
The strike created a major wedge
between the city’s labor movement
and Civil Rights Movement, and between elements of the African-American and Jewish communities. The
Ocean Hill–Brownsville conflict pitted
the UFT, which had a large Jewish
membership with tenure and other
contract rights, against AfricanAmerican leaders and parents who
insisted that their communities should
control the hiring, firing, curriculum,
and administration of schools in their
neighborhoods.
In the same year, after two
years of negotiations, DC 37 and
the city reached a first citywide
Public Workers

contract for a unit of 120,000
workers. The agreement enhanced
the employee pension plan and
made further changes, concerning
hours, overtime, and other working
conditions. In February 1969, the
city signed contracts with DC 37 for
more than 40,000 clerical and hospital workers, resulting in substantial
wage increases and a minimum
salary of $6,000.
By the end of Lindsay’s first
term, New York City’s new system of
collective bargaining had begun to
work. There were newly negotiated
contracts, a decline in strikes and
contract impasses, the consolidation
of bargaining units, fewer interunion rivalries, and a greater voice for
city workers in workplace policies.
Outside the city, there was a massive
wave of organizing by numerous
unions seeking to represent state
and local government workers with
bargaining rights under the Taylor
Law. The organizing led to a proliferation of new collective bargaining relationships, contracts, impasses, and
a large increase in strikes, which did
not dissipate until the late 1970s.
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Victor Gotbaum,
executive director
of DC 37 at a press
conference during
a strike of workers
responsible for the
operation of drawbridges, 1971
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City labor negotiations were
sometimes long and contentious, but
the fruit of the process was a substantial improvement in the economic well-being of municipal workers
and their families, along with greater
uniformity in city departmental
policies. Internal union bureaucracies
were established to negotiate and
pursue issues through the grievance
process. Lindsay took a leading
role in advocating for legal changes
to require nonmembers to pay an
agency fee for union representation
to help ensure labor peace. Satisfaction with the improvement in city
labor relations led DC 37, the USA,
and the TWU to support Lindsay’s
reelection in 1969.
This did not mean that all was
harmonious in Gotham. Firefighters
and police participated in sick-outs
and slowdowns in the early 1970s.
DC 37 and Teamsters Local 237
led a disastrous two-day June 1971

job action of 8,000 drawbridge
and sewer operators to protest the
failure of the state to approve further
enhancements to the pension plan
that had been negotiated with the
city. The strike resulted in major
traffic jams as thousands of motorists were unable to cross drawbridges and millions of tons of
untreated sewage was dumped into
the city’s waterways.
The 1971 strike was the antithesis of social unionism. Rather than
trying to build community support,
the strike had consequences that
angered the public, politicians, and
the press, feeding a growing dissatisfaction with the city’s trajectory.
Taxpayers, fueled in part by white
backlash, were resentful over the salaries and benefits for an increasingly
African-American and Latino municipal workforce. Financial analysts
questioned the city’s reliance on
short-term debt to finance budget
UNION CITY: 1898–1975

deficits emanating from a shrinking
tax base caused by deindustrialization and suburbanization, in addition

to the growing cost of expanded
municipal services and collective
bargaining agreements.

The Aftermath of the Fiscal
Crisis and Public-Sector
Unionization Today

T

hose dark clouds foreshadowed the mid-1970s fiscal
crisis, which upended, but did
not destroy, collective bargaining.
The shock of the fiscal crisis opened
the door for a new age of austerity
that included external controls over
negotiated contracts, layoffs, and
less militancy among city workers
and their unions. The concept of
government as the model employer
to be emulated by the private sector
disappeared from labor-advocacy
and public-policy discussions.
The relative weakness of city
unions at the bargaining table, growing out of the fiscal crisis, led them
to develop more sophisticated political-action programs, primarily as a
rearguard measure to preserve and
enhance benefits and protections.
Unions developed get-out-the-vote
initiatives, such as phone banking and
door-to-door canvassing, in support
of union-endorsed candidates in
primary and general elections.
Union density today among all
government workers in the New
York City metropolitan area is 69
percent. Constructive relationships
between the city and its unions
continue to form the necessary
bedrock for positive labor relations.
But the increased prioritization of
political action and the centralization of authority in union bureaucracies throughout the decades
caused membership mobilization
about workplace issues to atrophy.
Militancy still exists, but only within
Public Workers

occupational pockets, including the
unlikely pair of police and faculty
unions that have led street demonstrations and other forms of protest
in support of their respective bargaining demands.
Public-sector unions face new
threats, including the 2018 Supreme
Court decision striking down the
agency shop as unconstitutional,
thereby mandating the “right to
work” in public employment. These
developments have made public-sector collective labor rights
more vulnerable and has required
government workers and their
unions to begin to relearn the important organizing lessons of the past.

Members of the Uniformed Firefighters
Association Local
94 during a brief
(five-and-a-halfhour) strike, 1973

Photograph by Harry
Harris
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